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UNITED STATES v. BENKAHLA: ILLUSTRATING THE NEED FOR 
REFORM—THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S UNPRECEDENTED 
APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
GUIDELINE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT TO AN 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CONVICTION  
STEVEN A. BOOK* 
In United States v. Benkahla,1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit considered whether Sabri Benkahla, who was convicted 
of obstructing grand jury and FBI investigations concerning terrorists and 
terrorist groups, qualified for the obstruction of justice terrorism 
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline Manual 
Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2.2  At Benkahla‘s sentencing, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Benkahla qualified for 
the terrorism enhancement despite the absence of case law with respect to 
the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement3 and even though the 
effect of the enhancement was ―unequivocally severe.‖4  The district court 
even declared, ―Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist.‖5  Nonetheless, the court 
applied Section 3A1.4, which subjected Benkahla to an advisory sentence 
range of 210 to 262 months, after finding that the government‘s 
investigation in the case targeted specific terrorism offenses and that 
Benkahla‘s false statements actually obstructed that investigation.6 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Steven A. Book. 
* Steven A. Book is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law 
where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author is very grateful to Professor 
Sherri Lee Keene for her guidance and invaluable knowledge of United States sentencing 
jurisprudence.  The author would also like to thank Heather R. Pruger for her patience and 
insightful feedback, as well as the entire staff of the Maryland Law Review.  Lastly, the author 
owes a special thanks to Hannah Kon for her tremendous effort and unfailing encouragement 
throughout the writing process. 
 1. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 303, 305–06. 
 3. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756, 757 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff‟d, 530 F.3d 
300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 4. Id. at 751. 
 5. Id. at 759. 
 6. Id. at 757; see infra Part II. 
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Although the district court ultimately decided to downward depart7 
and place Benkahla within a Guideline range of 121 to 151 months,8 its 
analysis, which the Fourth Circuit endorsed, is disconcerting because it 
significantly eases the government‘s burden to prove that obstruction of 
justice convictions warrant the application of the terrorism enhancement.9  
Based on the Fourth Circuit‘s deferral to the district court opinion, 
defendants who are not convicted of crimes that directly involve terrorism 
and are unaware that their testimony is obstructing a terrorism investigation 
can receive a sentence of up to 262 months of imprisonment.10  In this case, 
there is a shocking disparity between the 33- to 41-month advisory 
sentencing range Benkahla would have received for a non-terrorism-related 
obstruction offense and the 210- to 262-month sentencing range imposed 
for obstructing an investigation into a federal crime of terrorism.11  The 
Fourth Circuit‘s overzealous use of Section 3A1.4, Note 2 in Benkahla 
indicates that the United States Sentencing Commission needs to reevaluate 
the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement.12 
I.  THE CASE 
On the orders of the FBI, Sabri Benkahla, a 27-year-old master‘s 
degree recipient from Falls Church, Virginia,13 was arrested in Saudi 
Arabia in 2003, where he had been studying Islamic law and traveling with 
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a member of the terrorist group al Qaeda.14  
Benkahla was detained by the United States government for a month15 
before he learned that he had been linked to a ―Virginia jihad network‖ of 
young Muslim American men who played paintball in the Virginia 
 
 7. In the federal sentencing guidelines, a ―downward departure‖ refers to ―a court's 
imposition of a sentence more lenient than the standard guidelines propose.‖  BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 496 (8th ed. 2004).  United States Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.3 provides that a 
court may downward depart ―[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal 
history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 
the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.‖  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 4A1.3 (2008). 
 8. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 759. 
 9. See infra Part IV.A. 
 10. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 11. See infra Part IV.C. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 13. Jenny Cuffe, US Muslims „Alienated by Patriot Act,‟ BBC NEWS, July 4, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/5145970.stm. 
 14. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 
(2009). 
 15. Cuffe, supra note 13. 
Book_FinalBookProof 10/15/2009  12:49 PM 
2009] UNITED STATES v. BENKAHLA 63 
 
countryside as a means of training for violent jihad overseas.16  A federal 
grand jury subsequently indicted Benkahla and charged him with ―willfully 
supplying or attempting to supply services to the Taliban, in violation of 50 
U.S.C. § 1705,‖ and with using a firearm in furtherance of that offense in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).17  According to the charges, Benkahla fired 
an automatic AK-47 rifle and rocket propelled grenades while at a training 
camp in Afghanistan operated by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani terrorist 
group, in the summer of 1999.18  Although provision of services to 
Lashkar-e-Taiba was not criminalized at that time, provision of services to 
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban violated the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.19 
In March 2004, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia acquitted Benkahla of all 
charges after finding that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he provided services to the Taliban or to the Taliban-controlled 
territory of Afghanistan.20  After his acquittal, Benkahla was subpoenaed 
and compelled to testify before a federal grand jury in August 2004 
regarding his participation in jihad training camps and combat in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan in the summer of 1999.21  The government also 
questioned Benkahla about individuals he knew who participated in such 
camps22 and several militants associated with the Dar al-Arqam Islamic 
Center, an organization in Falls Church, Virginia.23  Throughout the 
investigation, Benkahla denied participating in training relevant to violent 
jihad or knowing anything about the persons who facilitated such training.24 
 
 16. Jerry Markon, Man Indicted Again in Terror Probe; Defendant Was Acquitted in 
„Virginia Jihad Network‟ Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at B4. 
 17. United States v. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300 
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).  Benkahla was indicted with ten other 
individuals who were linked to the ―Virginia jihad network,‖ but his case was eventually severed 
because, unlike the other ten defendants, Benkahla was not charged with ―conspiracy . . . to 
engage in armed hostilities against the United States . . . [and] tak[ing] part in military expeditions 
against nations with which the United States was at peace.‖  Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 303–04. 
 18. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 545.  
 19. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36759 (July 7, 1999)). 
 20. Id. at 545–46.  Judge Brinkema believed that Benkahla attended a jihadist camp 
somewhere, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and fired a weapon while there, but ultimately 
determined there was insufficient evidence to establish that Benkahla‘s combat training activities 
occurred within the Taliban-controlled region of Afghanistan.  Id. at 546. 
 21. Id. at 544.  Benkahla testified before the grand jury a second time on November 16, 2004, 
id. at 545, and also met with the FBI several times in ancillary proceedings, Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 
304.  He was granted statutory immunity for truthful testimony.  Id. 
 22. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 547–49. 
 23. See United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 
530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 24. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 544–45. 
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On February 9, 2006, Benkahla was indicted for making false 
declarations to the grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, obstructing 
justice on account of false declarations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, 
and making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(a).25  On February 5, 2007, a jury convicted Benkahla on all 
counts.26   
At Benkahla‘s sentencing, the government argued that Benkahla 
qualified for a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Section 3A1.4, 
Application Note 2 of the United States Sentencing Guideline Manual.27  
The Eastern District of Virginia observed that Section 3A1.4 prescribes 
substantial sentencing increases when the offense for which a defendant has 
been convicted involved or was intended to promote (1) an ―investigation of 
a federal crime of terrorism‖ and (2) obstruction of that investigation.28  The 
court noted at the outset that ―[t]he guidelines provide no guidance as to 
what constitutes ‗an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‘ or 
‗obstructing‘ within the meaning of this seemingly broad enhancement.‖29  
In the absence of such guidance, the district court first concluded that 
an investigation is only an ―investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‖ 
within the meaning of Section 3A1.4 if it seeks specific information 
regarding particular terrorism offenses.30  Without such specificity, the 
court reasoned, the terrorism enhancement cannot apply to an obstruction of 
justice conviction.31  Because the government pointed to specific facts and 
circumstances of its ongoing investigation,32 the court held that Benkahla‘s 
false testimony satisfied the terrorism enhancement‘s ―motivational 
element‖—namely, that the testimony was ―calculated to influence or affect 
the conduct of [the United States] government.‖33  Significantly, the district 
 
 25. Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 305.  During the jury trial, the government‘s expert witness 
provided ample background testimony on terrorism and violent jihad worldwide, and an FBI agent 
working on Benkahla‘s case also testified on the subject.  Id. 
 26. Id.  Although the jury convicted Benkahla on all counts, it acquitted him of certain 
particular allegations in its special verdict form.  Id. 
 27. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 751. 
 28. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 29. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007)). 
 30. Id. at 754. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 756.  Specifically, the court found that the government met its burden of proof by 
demonstrating that the investigation sought information on al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba 
affiliates, and that those persons were being investigated for potential commissions of crimes 
within the ―enumerated offenses‖ of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).  Id. 
 33. Id. at 754–56.  The district court explained that this ―motivational element‖ derives from 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), which defines ―‗federal crime of terrorism‘‖ as ―‗an offense that—(A) is 
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 
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court found that Benkahla‘s obstruction met this motivational requirement 
even though it did ―not believe [Benkahla] had the willful intent to promote 
an act of terrorism.‖34  The court thereby ascertained that the investigation 
in Benkahla‘s case constituted an ―investigation of a federal crime of 
terrorism‖ as contemplated by Section 3A1.4.35 
Second, the district court explained that Section 3A1.4 requires a 
showing of actual obstruction.36  In its analysis of this requirement, the 
court observed that ―[i]n the same investigation in which [Benkahla] was 
questioned, eight individuals to whom he was connected went to foreign 
jihad training camps and one was convicted of soliciting treason to fight 
against the United States.‖37  The court also recognized that, at the time the 
FBI and grand juries questioned Benkahla, two leaders of Dar al-Arqam 
had not yet been indicted.38  Moreover, the government claimed that it still 
did not know the details about Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps or the 
whereabouts of Lashkar-e-Taiba‘s leaders due to Benkahla‘s false 
testimony.39  For these reasons, the district court concluded that Benkahla‘s 
false or intentionally misleading answers actually obstructed the 
investigation.40  Accordingly, the court ruled that Benkahla qualified for the 
terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, which increased his offense 
level from 26 to 32 and his criminal history category from Category I to 
Category VI.
41
  This ruling caused Benkahla‘s guideline range to jump 
from 33 to 41 months in prison to 210 to 262 months in prison.42 
Having determined the applicable sentencing range for Benkahla, the 
district court examined whether a prison sentence within the range of 210 to 
262 months served the goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).43  The court 
 
retaliate against government conduct; and (B) is a violation of . . . [a list of enumerated 
offenses].‘‖  Id. at 751–52 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006)) (alteration in original). 
 34. Id. at 760.  
 35. Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Id. (citing United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Va. 2005)). 
 37. Id. at 755.  Testimony secured from some of those individuals led to convictions for 
―specific terrorist acts in Australia, France, and England.‖  Id. 
 38.  Id.  One of those individuals, Ali Al-Timimi, was the leader Dar al-Arqam‘s violent 
faction and was later convicted of solicitation to levy war against the United States.  United States 
v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).  The other 
individual, Ahmed Omar Abu-Ali, was under investigation for conspiracy to levy war against the 
United States and to assassinate the President of the United States when Benkahla testified before 
the grand jury.  Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 755. 
 39. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  Section 3553(a) provides that a court shall impose a sentence ―sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary‖ to reflect the seriousness of the crime, promote respect for the law, punish 
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concluded that Benkahla was the ―quintessential candidate for a downward 
departure‖ under these criteria and reduced his sentence to 121 months.44  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered: (1) whether Benkahla‘s second 
prosecution violated the collateral estoppel component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) whether the trial court 
―admitted irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence regarding radical 
Islamic terrorism;‖ (3) whether the trial court violated the Sixth 
Amendment by applying Section 3A1.4‘s terrorism enhancement; and (4) 
whether the trial court erred in concluding that sufficient evidence existed 
to corroborate Benkahla‘s admissions and support the guilty verdict.45   
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (―SRA‖), Congress 
created the United States Sentencing Commission (the ―Commission‖) and 
authorized it to promulgate mandatory guidelines to eliminate ―unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.‖46  Following the Supreme Court of the United 
States‘ ruling in United States v. Booker,47 a district court judge must 
consult the advisory sentencing ranges in the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (the ―Guidelines‖), but may specifically tailor a 
sentence based on other statutory concerns.48  On appeal, assuming the 
lower court made a procedurally correct sentencing decision, an appellate 
 
justly, deter adequately, protect the public from further crimes, and provide adequate training or 
medical treatment to the defendant.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
 44. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 759.  The court stated that the Category IV range over-
represented the seriousness of Benkahla‘s criminal history because, outside of his conviction, he 
had no criminal record and there was no evidence that he ever committed an illegal act.  Id.  
Furthermore, the court reasoned that ―[Benkahla‘s] likelihood of ever committing another crime is 
infinitesimal.‖  Id. 
 45. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 
(2009).  This Note focuses on Benkahla‘s claim that the district court should not have applied the 
terrorism enhancement. 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).  The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of both the 
Commission and the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 374, 396–97 (1989) (holding that the use of the Commission to establish the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority and does not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine). 
 47. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The Booker Court declared that the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines should be considered in formulating criminal sentences but they would be only 
advisory, not mandatory, guidelines.  See id. at 244–46 (concluding that the SRA provision that 
made the Guidelines mandatory was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, 
and therefore had to be severed and excised from the SRA). 
 48. Id. at 245–46; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing the factors a district judge should 
consider when imposing a sentence). 
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court must then review the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard 
with an eye toward ―substantive reasonableness.‖49 
Although federal appellate courts have heard a number of Guidelines 
cases since Booker,50 Benkahla represents the first time a district court 
judge applied the Section 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement for an individual 
convicted of obstructing justice.51  The issues in Benkahla are therefore best 
understood by examining the legislative history of Section 3A1.4 and 
offenses for which federal courts have found the terrorism enhancement 
appropriate.52  It is also helpful to consider the court‘s discussion of 
Section 3A1.4, Note 2 in United States v. Biheiri53 and the sentences 
imposed in non-terrorism-related obstruction cases.54 
A.  Section 3A1.4 Establishes an Upward Sentencing Adjustment for 
Offenses that Involve or Are Intended to Promote Federal Crimes 
of Terrorism 
Prior to 1995, the Guidelines did not include an enhancement for 
conduct relating to terrorism offenses.55  In 1994, the Commission 
promulgated Section 3A1.4 pursuant to authority granted by Congress in 
Section 120004 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 (―VCCA‖).56  Section 3A1.4 now requires a twelve-level increase in 
offense level, to at least level thirty-two, and an increase in criminal history 
 
 49. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).  
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a 
change in the Guidelines that expands a sentencing range for a particular crime is not an ex post 
facto law because the Guidelines are merely advisory); United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 
1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that after the PROTECT Act amendment of 2003, prosecutors 
possess the same discretion to file ―acceptance of responsibility‖ motions under § 3E1.1(b) as they 
do ―substantial assistance‖ motions under § 5K1.1); United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1300 
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a district court remains obligated to correctly calculate the 
Guidelines range under the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), and that Booker did not 
render such calculation advisory). 
 51. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530 
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 52. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 53. 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2005) (mem.). 
 54. See infra Part II.C. 
 55. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994). 
 56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 526 (2008).  The VCCA directed 
the Commission to amend the Guidelines ―to provide an appropriate enhancement for any felony, 
whether committed within or outside the United States, that involves or is intended to promote 
international terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is itself an element of the crime.‖  
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120004, 108 
Stat. 1796, 2022.  In 1996, the Commission amended § 3A1.4 to apply ―more broadly to ‗Federal 
crimes of terrorism,‘ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g).‖  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL app. C, amend. 564 (2008). 
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to Category VI for any felony ―that involved, or was intended to promote, a 
federal crime of terrorism.‖57  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), a ―federal 
crime of terrorism‖ is defined as ―an offense that . . . is calculated to 
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, 
or to retaliate against government conduct; and . . . is a violation of‖ one of 
a list of federal criminal statutes.58 
The Guidelines Manual breaks down the general procedure for 
determining a sentence into a series of steps.59  After first determining the 
total offense level and criminal history category under those steps, the 
sentencing judge uses the Guidelines Sentencing Table to ascertain the 
applicable guideline range.60  A district court may depart from this 
guideline range and sentence a defendant outside that range if the court 
finds ―that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . .‖61 
B.  The Terrorism Enhancement Applies to a Variety of Federal 
Offenses 
Section 3A1.4 applies to a broad range of felonies,62 and operates even 
when the defendant was not convicted of a ―federal crime of terrorism.‖63  
 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2008).  A criminal history Category VI 
and offense level thirty-two produces a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008) (Sentencing Table). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006).  Application Note 1 of § 3A1.4 provides that ―‗federal 
crime of terrorism‘ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).‖  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2008). 
 59. For general sentencing application instructions, see the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2008).  First, the sentencing judge must determine the applicable offense 
guideline section in Chapter Two.  Id. § 1B1.1(a).  Next, the court selects the base-offense level 
and ―appl[ies] any appropriate specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special 
instructions contained in the particular guideline . . . .‖  Id. § 1B1.1(b).  The sentencing court then 
makes any adjustments to that base-offense level as warranted by adjustment factors.  Id. 
§ 1B1.1(b)–(c).   When there are multiple counts of conviction, the preceding steps are repeated 
for each count.  Id. § 1B1.1(d).  After the total offense level is determined, the court must calculate 
the defendant‘s criminal history category.  Id. § 1B1.1(f).  The criminal history category number is 
the sum of points given for each prior sentence the defendant has received.  Id. § 4A1.1. 
 60. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008) (Sentencing 
Table). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
 62. See id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (enumerating the specific offenses that Congress considers 
―[f]ederal crime[s] of terrorism‖). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 997–98, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which 
is not specifically enumerated in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), could serve as the basis for the terrorism 
enhancement); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 3A1.4 
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Indeed, as of June 2006, federal courts had convicted and sentenced 261 
defendants on terrorism charges.64  One of the most publicized of these 
convictions was in United States v. Lindh,65 in which the defendant, an 
American citizen, pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.204 and 545.206(a), and to carrying an explosive 
during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).66  
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, the parties agreed that the ―offense 
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism within 
the meaning of . . . Section 3A1.4.‖67  The Lindh court determined that a 
reduced sentence of twenty years was reasonable in part because the 
defendant convincingly declared his opposition to terrorism, proclaiming 
that he would not have joined the Taliban had he been fully informed about 
that regime.68 
Federal courts have also applied the terrorism enhancement to more 
―traditional‖ cases of terrorism, such as highjacking, murder, and mass 
destruction.69  For example, in United States v. Mandhai,70 the defendant 
pled guilty to conspiring to use explosives to destroy buildings used in 
interstate commerce.71  The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant‘s 
felony qualified for Section 3A1.4‘s sentencing enhancement because the 
defendant intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism.72  In support of 
its holding, the Mandhai court cited evidence that the defendant wanted to 
bomb electrical power stations in retaliation for the United States 
government‘s support of Israel and hoped that the resulting power outages 
 
could be applied to a sentence for conviction of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
which is not mentioned in § 2332b(g)(5)(B)). 
 64. COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE 
PAPER 14 (2006) [hereinafter COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf. 
 65. 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 66. Id. at 566. 
 67. Id. at 569.  The parties agreed that § 3A1.4 applied to the defendant‘s felony because ―the 
Taliban's control of Afghanistan and the activities of those individuals fighting in support of the 
Taliban provided protection and sanctuary to al Qaeda, a designated foreign terrorist 
organization.‖  Id. 
 68. Id. at 571–72. 
 69. COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER, supra note 64, at 25. 
 70. 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 71. Id. at 1246–47.  Although the defendant in Mandhai was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 844(i), which specifically lists the destruction of buildings used in interstate commerce by fire or 
explosives as a federal terrorism crime in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), conspiracy to commit the 
same offense is not listed in the statute.  Id. at 1247. 
 72. Id. at 1247–48.   
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would lead to civil strife throughout Miami.73  Nonetheless, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that the sentence range of 188 to 235 months, resulting from 
the twelve-level increase to the defendant‘s offense level under 
Section 3A1.4, was disproportionate compared to the nature of the crime.74  
On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 168 months, which the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded was reasonable.75 
Courts have also found that ―domestic terrorism‖ offenses committed 
by American citizens disaffected from mainstream society are subject to 
enhanced sentences under Section 3A1.4.76  Recently, in United States v. 
Thurston,77 defendant Kevin Tubbs pled guilty in the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon to acts of arson across five different states 
and destruction of a high voltage electric tower.78  The defendant and others 
committed these crimes, which demolished numerous buildings and 
vehicles and caused tens of millions of dollars in damages, on behalf of the 
Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front.79  At sentencing, 
the defendant claimed that using the terrorism enhancement to calculate his 
and his co-defendants‘ sentences ―contravene[d] congressional intent that 
the Guidelines achieve fairness and avoid unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing.‖80  The District of Oregon rejected this argument, stating that 
―[i]f . . . the government is overreaching due to political considerations, 
either the enhancement will not apply to defendants‘ offenses or defendants 
will be eligible for a downward departure.‖81  Thus, the district court 
 
 73. Id. at 1246, 1248.  Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the defendant 
intended his crime to influence government conduct.  Id. at 1248. 
 74. Id. at 1249–50.  In Mandhai, the defendant had conspired to destroy government buildings 
by means of fire or explosives, had second thoughts about the conspiracy, and finally withdrew 
after being confronted by government agents.  Id. at 1250. 
 75. United States v. Mandhai, 179 F. App‘x 576, 577 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 76. COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER, supra note 64, at 59. 
 77. No. CR 06-60070-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176 (D. Or. May 21, 2007).  
 78. Id. at *1–*2. 
 79. Id. at *2.  The district court explained that the defendants, including Tubbs, ―targeted 
federal government agencies and private parties they believed responsible for degradation of the 
environment, tree harvesting, and cruel treatment of animals.‖  Id. 
 80. Id. at *18.  The defendants argued that the government had not sought the terrorism 
enhancement in other Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front prosecutions related to 
their case or in prosecution of persons who possessed biological toxins.  Id. 
 81. Id.  Moreover, the district court noted that ―the terrorism enhancement ha[d] been applied 
in cases where far fewer or no acts of arson were committed.‖  See id. at *18–*19 (referencing 
United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 2005), where the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
application of the enhancement to a defendant who threw a Molotov cocktail into a municipal 
building housing a police department; United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1105, 1110 (10th 
Cir. 2005), where the defendant who committed arson by pouring and igniting gasoline on an 
Internal Revenue Service office received an enhanced sentence; and United States v. Mandhai, 
375 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
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concluded that the longer sentence the defendant would receive did not 
render application of Section 3A1.4 disparate or unfair.82  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant‘s 151-month sentence.83 
C.  Application of the Terrorism Enhancement to the Offense of 
Obstructing an Investigation of a Federal Crime of Terrorism 
In Lindh, Mandhai, and Thurston, the application of Section 3A1.4 
was fairly straightforward because each case involved defendants convicted 
of committing or conspiring to commit violent acts of terrorism.84  There 
are, however, a variety of less dangerous and less violent offenses to which 
Section 3A1.4 also applies.  Following the events of September 11, 2001, 
Congress focused with renewed intensity on terrorism offenses and 
expanded the scope of the terrorism enhancement to include crimes 
involving the obstruction of justice.  In response to the USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001,85 the Commission adopted Application Note 2 to Section 3A1.4,86 
which provides that ―obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of 
terrorism [is] considered to have involved, or to have been intended to 
promote, that federal crime of terrorism.‖87 
United States v. Biheiri is one of just three cases in which the 
government requested that the court apply the terrorism enhancement for 
―‗obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism.‘‖88  In 
Biheiri, the government proved at trial that the defendant fraudulently 
procured his naturalization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and made 
false statements in his naturalization application in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
 
 82. Id. at *19. 
 83. United States v. Tubbs, 290 F. App‘x 66, 67–68 (2008). 
 84. See supra Part II.B. 
 85. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (―USA PATRIOT Act‖), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 803, 115 Stat. 
272. 
 86. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2008). 
 87. Id. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.2. 
 88. See United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing 
United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), and United States v. 
Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005), as the only two cases before Benkahla in which the 
government requested the enhancement under Note 2 of § 3A1.4).  The Seventh Circuit‘s analysis 
of Note 2 to § 3A1.4 provides little guidance because the facts of that case clearly established that 
the defendant did not obstruct an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism.  See Arnaout, 431 
F.3d at 1003 (upholding the district court‘s refusal to apply the obstruction of justice terrorism 
enhancement).  Even though the defendant, who was the executive director of an alleged 
humanitarian organization, made false statements that obstructed an investigation of aid to 
military forces in Bosnia and Chechnya, that investigation was not concerned with the provision 
of support to terrorists or terrorist organizations.  Id. at 999, 1003. 
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§ 1015(a).89  On three separate occasions, the government sought the 
terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2.90  On the 
third attempt, the government argued that the defendant lied about his 
relationship with an individual who was known to be affiliated with a 
terrorist organization, thus obstructing a terrorist-financing investigation.91  
Judge Thomas Ellis of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia first stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3553 requires sentencing 
judges to consider various factors in determining whether a sentencing 
range is appropriate, but emphasized that ―sentencing, in the end, must 
involve the exercise of judgment.‖92  Later in its opinion, the district court 
declared that the plain language of Section 3A1.4 clearly demonstrates that 
a defendant must actually obstruct an investigation of a federal crime of 
terrorism to receive the enhancement; a mere attempt to obstruct an 
investigation is insufficient.93  As such, the district court found that the 
defendant did not actually obstruct the investigation because the 
interviewing federal agents knew that his statement regarding ties to a 
known terrorist was false.94  Thus, the district court concluded that the 
terrorism enhancement was unwarranted.95 
While no court other than the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the 
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement, the Guidelines section for 
non-terrorism-related obstruction of justice convictions has been applied 
extensively by many courts.  Obstruction of justice crimes are governed by 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1520.96  Sentencing of defendants convicted under 
those statutes mainly proceeds in accordance with Section 2J1.2 of the 
Guidelines,97 which carries with it a base offense level of fourteen.98  
Section 2J1.2(c) specifies that when a defendant‘s offense involves 
obstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, the court 
should cross-reference and apply Section 2X3.1.99  The base offense level 
 
 89. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 598. 
 92. Id. at 594. 
 93. Id. at 598.  The district court explained that unlike § 3C1.1—the general obstruction of 
justice sentencing guideline—and 18 U.S.C. § 1503—the federal obstruction of justice statute—
which both punish attempts to obstruct, § 3A1.4 makes no mention of attempted obstruction.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 600. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1520 (2006). 
 97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A, at 546 (2008). 
 98. Id. § 2J1.2(a).  Where the defendant has a criminal history of Category I, the resulting 
guideline range is fifteen to twenty-one months.  Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 99. Id. § 2J1.2(c).  
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for Section 2X3.1 is computed by subtracting six levels from the offense 
level ―for the underlying offense,‖100 and is not to exceed thirty or fall 
below four.101 
Because Section 2J1.2(c) requires a sentencing court to cross-reference 
Section 2X3.1 for cases in which a defendant obstructed an investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal offense, the resulting sentences are longer than 
those where Section 2X3.1 does not apply.  For example, in United States v. 
Crawford,102 the defendant, a Memphis attorney, pled guilty to obstructing 
the prosecution of one of his clients for possessing a firearm after having 
already been convicted of a felony.103  The court first applied Section 2J1.2 
to the defendant‘s obstruction of justice charges and then considered 
Section 2X3.1.104  The applicable Guidelines section for the client‘s 
conduct was Section 2K2.1,105 which carried a base level offense of 
twenty-four.106  The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court‘s application of 
Section 2X3.1(a) to the defendant‘s sentence because the resulting offense 
level of eighteen was greater than fourteen, the level attributable to an 
obstruction of justice offense.107  The court ultimately sentenced the 
defendant to seventy-one months imprisonment for obstructing justice.108 
Similarly, in United States v. Bell,109 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois convicted the defendant of obstructing 
justice after he refused to testify before a federal grand jury about a murder 
that he and five other individuals committed.110  In applying Section 2X3.1, 
the district court determined that the underlying offense committed by the 
subject of the grand jury investigation was a racketeering charge under 18 
U.S.C. § 1959.111  Because the most serious racketeering activity attributed 
 
 100. Id. § 2X3.1(a)(1).  ―An [u]nderlying offense‖ is ―the offense as to which the defendant is 
convicted of being an accessory.‖  Id. § 2X3.1 cmt. n.1. 
 101. Id. § 2X3.1(a)(2)–(3). 
 102. 281 F. App‘x 444 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 103. Id. at 446–47.  The obstruction violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510(a) and 1512(c)(2).  Id. at 446.  
Specifically, the defendant obstructed justice by bribing two undercover police officers to get a 
firearms charge against the defendant‘s client dismissed and by supplying an undercover police 
officer with a pistol and two shipments of crack cocaine as part of an agreement to have one of the 
defendant‘s fellow gang members murdered.  Id. at 447–48. 
 104. Id. at 450. 
 105. Section 2K2.1 applied because the court found that unlawfully possessing a firearm was 
the underlying crime.   Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 446. 
 109. No. 02 CR 51, 2002 WL 31804211 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2002) (mem.). 
 110. See id. at *1–*2. The defendant‘s actions in obstructing justice violated 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  
Id. at *2. 
 111. Id. at *3. 
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to the defendant was murder, the district court applied the second degree 
murder offense level of thirty-three.112  Section 2X3.1 reduced the 
defendant‘s offense level to twenty-seven and, with a Category IV criminal 
history, the resulting guideline range was seventy-seven to ninety-six 
months.113  The district court judge consequently sentenced the defendant 
to ninety-six months in prison.114 
Finally, in United States v. Quam,115 the defendant was convicted of 
obstructing justice after she falsely told a grand jury that she knew nothing 
about her live-in boyfriend‘s drug-trafficking activities.116  Although the 
defendant would have had an offense level of fourteen under Section 2J1.2, 
the district court also applied Section 2X3.1 because the defendant had 
obstructed a criminal investigation.117  The underlying drug-charge 
offense—possession of roughly 2.3 grams of methamphetamine and 111.5 
grams of marijuana118—prescribed an offense level of twenty, from which 
the district court subtracted six levels to arrive at the defendant‘s total 
offense level of fourteen.119  The district court thereby imposed a mere 
fifteen-month prison sentence, which was subsequently upheld by the 
Eighth Circuit.120 
III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In United States v. Benkahla,121 the Fourth Circuit held that Benkahla 
qualified for the terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, and thus 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia.122  Judge James Harvie Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth Circuit, 
noted that the appellate court must ―‗review the sentence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard‘ with an eye toward both ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive 
reasonableness.‘‖123  After reviewing the language and legislative histories 
 
 112. Id. at *3–*4. 
 113. Id. at *4.  In reaching this sentencing range, the district court reduced the defendant‘s total 
offense level to twenty-four because he accepted responsibility for the crime.  Id. 
 114. United States v. Jackson, No. 02 CR 52, 2003 WL 444459, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2003) 
(mem.).  The defendant in Bell actually received an effective sentence of just twenty-six months 
because the district court judge ruled that the first seventy months would be served concurrently 
with the defendant‘s related state sentence.  Id. at *6. 
 115. 367 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 116. Id. at 1007. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 1007, 1009. 
 120. Id. at 1007. 
 121. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 303. 
 123. Id. at 311 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). 
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of Section 3A1.4 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(g)(5), the Fourth Circuit 
determined that applying the terrorism sentencing enhancement in 
Benkahla‘s case ―seem[ed] straightforward.‖124 
First, Judge Wilkinson affirmed the district court‘s finding that the 
investigation in which Benkahla was questioned was an investigation of a 
federal crime of terrorism.125  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Benkahla 
satisfied the second element of Section 2332b(g)(5) by obstructing a grand 
jury investigating violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.126  The 
Fourth Circuit rejected Benkahla‘s contention that the investigation in his 
case was too general because the violations the government was 
investigating involved specific jihadist camps training people to fight the 
governments of India, Russia, and the United States.127  Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the ―motivational element‖ of Section 2332b(g)(5) 
was satisfied.128 
Second, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the district court‘s 
determination that the term ―obstructing‖ in Section 3A1.4 required actual 
obstruction.129  Judge Wilkinson extensively quoted the district court‘s 
factual findings, and found that Benkahla‘s falsehoods ―not only delayed 
some parts of the investigation, but wholly frustrated others.‖130  In 
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated that ―the terrorism enhancement is 
doing just what it ought to do: Punishing more harshly than other criminals 
those whose wrongs served an end more terrible than other crimes.‖131  
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit approved the terrorism enhancement as 
applied to Benkahla.132 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Benkahla, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Eastern 
 
 124. Id.  Judge Wilkinson rejected Benkahla‘s argument that Note 2 of Section 3A1.4 
contradicted Section 3A1.4 itself because the language of the commentary and the Guidelines are 
―identical in all material respects.‖  Id. at 312. 
 125. Id. at 313. 
 126. Id. at 311–12. 
 127. Id. at 313. 
 128. Id. at 312–13.  The Fourth Circuit essentially reiterated the district court‘s analysis of the 
motivational element.  See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.  
 129. See Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 313 (―There is no need to review the district court‘s legal 
conclusions.  Whether those conclusions are correct or incorrect, the court‘s factual findings 
clearly support applying the enhancement.‖). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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District of Virginia‘s application of the Section 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing 
enhancement and found that a sentence of 121 months, after a downward 
departure, was appropriate.133  The Fourth Circuit deferred entirely to the 
district court, which had found that Benkahla qualified for the obstruction 
of justice terrorism enhancement because he made false material 
declarations to a grand jury, obstructed justice, and made false material 
statements to the FBI, all in connection with the government‘s investigation 
of terrorist groups and terrorist training camps.134  The district court‘s 
analysis of the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement, however, 
disregarded both the nature and seriousness of Benkahla‘s offense and 
principles of sentencing proportionality.135  Moreover, the district court‘s 
interpretation of Section 3A1.4, Note 2 significantly dilutes the standard for 
proving that the terrorism enhancement applies to an obstruction of justice 
conviction.136  In effect, the district court‘s opinion did not properly 
distinguish between an individual who directly promotes a federal crime of 
terrorism and an individual who obstructs an investigation into a federal 
crime of terrorism.137  Benkahla, therefore, represents an overzealous use of 
the terrorism enhancement and indicates that the Commission needs to 
reevaluate the scope and severity of Section 3A1.4‘s Note 2. 
A.  The Benkahla Court Diluted an Already Weak Framework for 
Determining Applicability of the Obstruction of Justice Terrorism 
Enhancement 
Senior District Judge James C. Cacheris applied the obstruction of 
justice terrorism enhancement in Benkahla despite recognizing that ―[t]he 
[G]uidelines provide no guidance as to what constitutes ‗an investigation of 
a federal crime of terrorism‘ and ‗obstructing‘ within the meaning of this 
seemingly broad terrorism enhancement.‖138  Judge Cacheris‘s analysis, 
which the Fourth Circuit subsequently endorsed, makes it significantly 
easier for the government to prove that an obstruction of justice conviction 
similar to Benkahla‘s warrants application of the terrorism enhancement. 
In the first part of its analysis, the district court concluded that the 
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement should apply only when a 
defendant obstructs investigations into specific terrorism offenses within a 
 
 133. Id. at 303, 305–06. 
 134. Id. at 303. 
 135. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 136. See infra Part IV.A. 
 137. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 138. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530 
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
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discrete set of facts.139  The requirement of an investigation into a 
sufficiently specific offense limits the scope of ―an investigation of a 
federal crime of terrorism‖ by making the enhancement inappropriate in the 
context of ―general terrorism investigations or intelligence gathering.‖140  
At the same time, however, it enables the government to prove that a 
defendant‘s obstruction was ―calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
the government‖ merely by showing that a terrorism investigation focused 
on specific facts, persons, and offenses.141  In other words, rather than 
focusing on the individual‘s intent, the district court‘s evaluation of the 
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement shifts the focus to the nature of 
the investigation.  As a result, the prosecution in Benkahla had to prove 
only that its terrorism investigation was sufficiently specific to satisfy 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)‘s ―motivational element‖—whether or not Benkahla 
willfully intended to promote an act of terrorism was irrelevant.142 
Second, in concluding that Benkahla‘s offense actually obstructed the 
FBI and grand jury investigations,143 the district court appears to have 
relaxed its own standard for determining what constitutes an obstruction of 
justice under Section 3A1.4.144  In his discussion of the terrorism 
enhancement‘s ―actual obstruction‖ requirement, Judge Cacheris found that 
the FBI investigation in which Benkahla was questioned sought information 
regarding (1) Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps, training techniques, 
curriculum, and locations; (2) individuals who may have received training 
at such camps; and (3) individuals believed to have aided others in 
obtaining jihad training.145  Next, the court stated that the government ―did 
 
 139. Id. at 752. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 142. The district court stated:  
As to the motivation for his untruthfulness, this Court is unsure.  Defendant may have 
been motivated out of a desire not to be seen as involved with illegal activities.  He may 
have been concerned about potential hardship he might cause others.  He may have 
been embarrassed of his own conduct. 
Id. at 760.  The court also opined that a sentence of 210 months for making false statements 
―without the intent to promote a crime of terrorism‖ is too harsh to achieve the goals set out in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  Id. at 761. 
 143. Id. at 757. 
 144. In United States v. Biheiri, decided three years before Benkahla, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia ruled that § 3A1.4, Note 2 applies only if a defendant actually 
obstructed an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism.  341 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Va. 
2005).  The Biheiri Court ruled that the defendant‘s obstruction offense in that case did not satisfy 
the enhancement‘s actual obstruction prong because the government was already aware of the 
information that it sought.  Id. at 600; see supra Part II.C. 
 145. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757.  Before detailing the evidence related to the 
government‘s investigation, the district court made the threshold observation that Benkahla‘s 
conviction involved providing false or misleading statements.  Id. 
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not, and in some cases, still does not, possess the specific information 
which it sought,‖ and thus concluded that Benkahla actually obstructed the 
FBI‘s investigation.146 
The district court‘s reasoning is flawed in that it fails to establish a 
causal connection between Benkahla‘s false statements and the 
government‘s lack of information on violent jihad.  Specifically, if the 
government did not know any details about Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps 
or the identities of persons believed to have aided others in obtaining jihad 
training, what was the court‘s factual basis for determining that, but for 
Benkahla‘s obstruction, the government would have known those 
details?147  Moreover, even if Benkahla lied during the 2004 grand jury and 
FBI investigations regarding his relationships with certain individuals, there 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that those falsehoods ―not 
only delayed some parts of the investigation, but wholly frustrated 
others.‖148  In sum, the district court‘s reasoning, adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit, suggests that the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement 
applies even in the absence of any evidence that a defendant‘s false 
statements actually obstructed the investigation in which he was questioned.  
Accordingly, enhancing Benkahla‘s sentence under Section 3A1.4 was 
unjustifiable. 
B.  Application Note 2 of Section 3A1.4 Creates Inequitable Results 
Because It Provides an Identical Guideline Range for Obstruction 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. (―[B]ecause of Defendant‘s false or intentionally misleading answers, the 
Government still does not know the identity or whereabouts of the persons about whom Defendant 
was questioned, their involvement with Lashkar-e-Taiba, and their role in aiding persons to obtain 
jihad training.‖).  Indeed, this section of the district court‘s opinion failed to acknowledge that it 
had acquitted Benkahla in 2004 on charges that he participated in a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp 
in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.  See supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  Instead, the court observed that the government could not account for Benkahla for a mere 
five days during his 1999 trip to South Asia.  Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
 148. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (mem.), aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300 
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).  The Fourth Circuit‘s assertion that 
Benkahla‘s obstruction ―wholly frustrated‖ parts of the FBI‘s investigation directly contradicts the 
district court‘s finding that ―the extent of [Benkahla]‘s actual obstruction was hardly devastating 
to the [FBI‘s] investigation.‖  Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 760.  The fact that the two primary 
persons of interest to the FBI in its investigation were each convicted in 2005, despite Benkahla‘s 
false declarations, substantiates the district court‘s findings.  A jury convicted Ali al-Timimi in 
April 2005 on various charges, including soliciting others to levy war against the United States, 
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.  Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 303; News Release, Dep‘t of 
Justice, Dep‘t of Justice Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001 (June 23, 2006).  
In November 2005, a jury convicted Ahmed Omar Abu Ali of, among other violations, providing 
material support to al Qaeda, conspiracy to assassinate the U.S. President, conspiracy to commit 
air piracy, and conspiracy to destroy aircraft.  United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 225–26 (4th 
Cir. 2008). 
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Offenses and Offenses that Directly Involve a Federal Crime of 
Terrorism 
Benkahla marks the first time a federal court applied the terrorism 
enhancement for obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of 
terrorism.149  In contrast, numerous defendants have ―received similar or 
even lesser sentences for significantly more severe, violent [terrorism] 
offenses.‖150  Section 3A1.4 provides an appropriate punishment for those 
defendants due to the seriousness of their crimes and the need to protect the 
public.151  By broadening Section 3A1.4 to include the offense of 
obstructing a terrorism investigation, however, the severity of the penalty 
no longer fits the dangerousness of the crime. 
The excessiveness of Benkahla‘s sentence is evidenced by comparing 
his criminal conduct with the criminal conduct and respective sentences of 
the defendants in Thurston, Mandhai, and Lindh.  For instance, Benkahla‘s 
sentence of 121 months is only thirty months less than that given to a 
defendant who committed multiple acts of arson and destroyed a high 
voltage electrical tower by fire.152  Similarly, Benkahla‘s sentence is only 
forty-seven months less than the sentence given to a defendant who 
conspired to bomb government buildings and recruited others to help carry 
out the plot,153 and only eight years shorter than the sentence received by an 
American citizen who fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan against United 
States military forces.154  Moreover, in contrast to the defendants in these 
cases, Benkahla did not commit or even attempt to commit any violent acts.  
This renders incomprehensible the Fourth Circuit‘s declaration that ―the 
terrorism enhancement is doing just what it ought to do: Punishing more 
 
 149. See Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (―[N]o court has ever applied the enhancement for 
‗obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism,‘ and in only two such cases has the 
Government requested it.‖). 
 150. Id. at 761; see also supra Part II.B. 
 151.  See Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 761–62 (discussing Benkahla‘s co-defendants who 
―committed and were convicted of more dangerous and more violent offenses‖ than Benkahla, and 
thus received enhanced sentences under § 3A1.4 that adequately served the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 152. See United States v. Tubbs, 290 F. App‘x 66, 67–69 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying § 3A1.4 to 
an eco-terrorist convicted of arson and destroying an energy facility, and thus affirming the 
sentencing court‘s imposition of a 151-month sentence following a downward departure). 
 153. See United States v. Mandhai, 179 F. App‘x 576, 576–77 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming a 
168-month sentence, following a downward departure, for a defendant‘s felony offense of 
involving or intending to promote federal crime of terrorism by conspiring to destroy buildings 
affecting interstate commerce by means of fire or explosives). 
 154. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566, 573 (E.D. Va. 2002) (sentencing a 
college-educated American citizen to twenty years in prison under § 3A1.4 after he pled guilty to 
supplying services to the Taliban and to carrying an explosive while fighting on behalf of the 
Taliban against United States soldiers in Afghanistan). 
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harshly than other criminals those whose wrongs served an end more 
terrible than other crimes.‖155  In reality, the obstruction of justice terrorism 
enhancement—in terms of proportionality—is punishing more harshly 
those who interfere with terrorism investigations than those who committed 
the egregious acts themselves. 
Finally, the district court rejected Benkahla‘s contention that 
application of the terrorism enhancement was unfair and disparate in light 
of his conduct on the grounds that a defendant will be eligible for a 
downward departure in sentencing if Section 3A1.4 over-represents the 
seriousness of his conduct.156  Although the court‘s decision to reduce 
Benkahla‘s sentence seems appropriate, it further evinces that the 210- to 
262-month guideline range under the obstruction of justice terrorism 
enhancement is draconian.  Similarly, granting undue discretion to 
sentencing judges to depart from the guideline range is inconsistent with the 
Guidelines‘ objective of equal treatment and coordinated sentencing among 
the federal courts.157 
C.  Benkahla Illustrates that the Obstruction of Justice Terrorism 
Enhancement Imposes a Disproportionate Sentence Range 
Compared to the Advised Sentence Range for Obstructing an 
Investigation of a Non-Terrorism Criminal Offense 
The obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement is unequivocally 
severe compared to the sentencing range for non-terrorism-related 
obstruction of justice convictions.158  The district court‘s application of 
Section 3A1.4 maximized Benkahla‘s criminal history to Category VI and 
increased his offense level to thirty-two.159  As a result of this adjustment, 
Benkahla‘s guideline range was 210 to 262 months.160  By comparison, 
without judicial determination that the terrorism enhancement applied, 
 
 155. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 
(2009). 
 156. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758–59 & n.7 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), 
aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009) (citing United States v. 
Thurston, No. CR 06-60070-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *18 (D. Or. May 21, 2007)). 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 (2008) (recommending a base 
offense level of fourteen that, combined with a criminal history of Category I, renders a guideline 
range of fifteen to twenty-one months), with id. § 3A1.4 (increasing a defendant‘s offense level to 
thirty-two and criminal history to Category VI, which renders a guideline range of 210 to 262 
months); see also id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 159. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
 160. Id. 
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Benkahla‘s sentence would have been only thirty-three to forty-one months, 
even taking into account Section 2X3.1.161 
To appreciate how substantial this disparity is in light of the offense 
committed, consider a hypothetical defendant who is convicted of the same 
obstruction offense as Benkahla.162  Assume, however, that the 
government‘s investigation was not actually obstructed because, although 
the hypothetical defendant misled the grand jury and the government, 
investigators were already aware of the information they sought prior to the 
defendant‘s testimony.163  Assuming also that, like Benkahla, the defendant 
has no prior criminal history and has engaged in model citizenry outside the 
context of the instant case, the resulting guideline range would be fifteen to 
twenty-one months.164  Under these circumstances, it is patently certain that 
an appellate court would find unreasonable a sentence of 121 months, a 
600% upward departure from the highest guideline range.165  None of the 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors would support such an enhancement.166 
A review of the sentences imposed on individuals who obstructed 
investigations of serious crimes unrelated to acts of terrorism further 
establishes the unreasonableness of Benkahla‘s 121-month sentence.  Most 
notably, Benkahla‘s sentence is an astounding 106 months longer than that 
imposed on a defendant whose sentence was based on an underlying 
offense of trafficking 111.5 grams of marijuana, 2.3 grams of 
methamphetamine, and various other items associated with drug 
trafficking.167  Benkahla‘s sentence was also fifty months greater than the 
 
 161. In Benkahla, the underlying crime that the government was investigating was providing 
resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 
2339B, which carry a base offense level of twenty-six.  Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 754; U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (2008).  Under § 2X3.1, a defendant‘s base offense 
level for obstruction of justice is set at six levels less than the offense level of the underlying 
offense, netting an adjusted offense level of twenty.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2X3.1(a)(1).  Because Benkahla had a criminal history of Category I, the resulting guideline 
range would have been thirty-three to forty-one months.  See id. ch. 5, pt. A.  The district court in 
Benkahla did not address the accessory after the fact guideline because the terrorism enhancement 
increased the guidelines sentence to 210 to 262 months, regardless of whether the cross-reference 
applied. 
 162. See Amici Curiae Br. of the Council on American-Islam Relations, and Muslim Am. 
Soc‘y Freedom Found. in Supp. of the Appellant at 24, United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300 
(4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4778). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 98. 
 165. Amici Curiae Br. in Supp. of the Appellant at 25, Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300 (No. 07-4778). 
 166. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 167. See United States v. Quam, 367 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding the 
imposition of a fifteen-month sentence for a defendant convicted of false declarations before a 
grand jury and obstruction of justice, where the defendant actively participated in the selling of 
Schedule I drugs and lied to investigators about her boyfriend‘s drug trafficking activities). 
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sentence imposed on a defendant who obstructed the prosecution of his 
client for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of two prior 
violent felonies,168 and twenty-five months greater than the sentence 
received by a defendant who refused to testify about the beating death of a 
young woman where the defendant was a known participant.169 
The underlying crimes in those cases were of a violent nature or 
involved large quantities of potentially lethal drugs, yet the perpetrators of 
those crimes received far lighter sentences than Benkahla.  There is nothing 
in the facts of Benkahla to suggest that a sentence of 121 months would 
have been reasonable without the finding that the terrorism enhancement 
applied.  Indeed, all of the circumstances present in Benkahla that reflected 
upon Section 3553(a) factors were mitigating rather than aggravating.170  
According to the district court, Benkahla had absolutely no prior history of 
criminal behavior, presented little risk of criminal recidivism, was a model 
citizen, received a master‘s degree from The Johns Hopkins University, 
volunteered as a national elections officer in local, state, and national 
elections, and was a loving husband and father to his four-year-old son.171  
The district court even declared that ―Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist.‖172  
Thus, applying the terrorism enhancement to make Benkahla‘s sentence 
eighty months longer than the maximum sentence for a non-terrorism-
related obstruction of justice conviction violates principles of fundamental 
fairness and sharply contradicts the intent of the Guidelines, which were 
designed to promote uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.173 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia‘s analysis of the 
sentencing issue in United States v. Benkahla is more than disappointing.  
Confronted by the question of whether a defendant convicted of obstructing 
justice qualified for the terrorism enhancement, the court begged the 
question by replying that Benkahla‘s offense was made in connection with 
the government‘s investigation of terrorism and thus warranted Section 
 
 168. See United States v. Crawford, 281 F. App‘x 444, 450–53 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the 
district court properly computed the defendant‘s seventy-one-month sentence when it applied 
§ 2X3.1). 
 169. See United States v. Bell, No. 02 CR 51, 2002 WL 31804211, at *1–*4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 
2002) (sentencing the defendant to ninety-six months in prison based on the obstruction of justice 
guideline § 2J1.2, and the underlying offense of second degree murder). 
 170. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 171. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 759 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530 
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra Part II. 
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3A1.4‘s sharp sentencing increase.174  The sparsity of the court‘s analysis is 
particularly troubling because Benkahla‘s offenses neither directly involved 
nor were intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism, and Benkahla 
did not share the same characteristics or conduct of a typical terrorist.175  In 
addition, the district court‘s discussion of Section 3A1.4, Application Note 
2‘s ―actual obstruction‖ requirement is ineffectual because it does not show 
any link between Benkahla‘s obstruction and the government‘s inability to 
gather information about suspected terrorists and terrorist groups.176  The 
Fourth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court‘s decision, averring, 
―[t]here is no need to review the district court‘s legal conclusions‖ because 
―[a]ll the evidence indicates‖ that Benkahla lied about his association with 
violent jihad and terrorism.177 
Benkahla also illustrates the need to reform the obstruction of justice 
terrorism enhancement.  The Guidelines are supposed to promote an 
objective sentencing system that eliminates unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.178  Yet, in comparing the sentences imposed on persons who 
committed dangerous and violent offenses to Benkahla‘s 121-month 
sentence, the disparity is staggering.179  For these reasons, the Sentencing 
Commission must provide a standard definition for ―obstructing an 
investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‖ and reevaluate the severity of 
Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2‘s enhancement.  To do otherwise would 














 174. See supra Part I. 
 175. See supra Parts I and IV.A. 
 176. See supra Part IV.A. 
 177. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 
(2009). 
 178. See supra Part II. 
 179. See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
Book_FinalBookProof 10/15/2009  12:49 PM 




United States Code 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b.  Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries 
 
 (g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section— 
 (5) the term ―Federal crime of terrorism‖ means an offense 
that— 
 (A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct; and 
 (B) is a violation of— 
 (i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
facilities), 37 (relating to violence at international airports), 81 
(relating to arson within special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons), 175c 
(relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), 
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 351 (relating to 
congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and 
kidnapping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 832 (relating to 
participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats 
to the United States)[,] 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic 
explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to arson and bombing of 
Government property risking or causing death), 844(i) (relating to 
arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce), 
930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on 
a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to 
conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad), 
1030(a)(1) (relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) 
through (v) (relating to protection of computers), 1114 (relating 
to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the 
United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of 
foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected 
persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361 (relating to 
government property or contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction 
of communication lines, stations, or systems), 1363 (relating to 
injury to buildings or property within special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a) (relating to 
destruction of an energy facility), 1751(a), (b), (c), or (d) (relating 
to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination and 
kidnapping), 1992 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of 
violence against railroad carriers and against mass transportation 
systems on land, on water, or through the air), 2155 (relating to 
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destruction of national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 
2156 (relating to national defense materials, premises, or 
utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 
2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332 
(relating to certain homicides and other violence against United 
States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a 
(relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating 
to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2332f 
(relating to bombing of public places and facilities), 2332g 
(relating to missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h 
(relating to radiological dispersal devices), 2339 (relating to 
harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing material 
support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material 
support to terrorist organizations), 2339C (relating to financing of 
terrorism), 2339D (relating to military-type training from a 
foreign terrorist organization), or 2340A (relating to torture) of 
this title; 
 (ii) sections 92 (relating to prohibitions governing atomic 
weapons) or 236 (relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122 or 2284);   
 (iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy) . . . or section 
60123(b) (relating to destruction of interstate gas or hazardous 
liquid pipeline facility) of title 49; or 
 (iv) section 1010A of the Controlled Substances Import and 
Export Act (relating to narco-terrorism). 
 
 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006). 
 
 United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 
§ 3A1.4.  Terrorism 
 
 (a)  If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to 
promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if 
the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level 
32. 
 (b)  In each such case, the defendant‘s criminal history category 
from Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) 
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Application Notes: 
1.  “Federal Crime of Terrorism” Defined.—For purposes of this 
guideline, “federal crime of terrorism” has the meaning given 
that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
2.  Harboring, Concealing, and Obstruction Offenses.—For 
purposes of this guideline, an offense that involved (A) harboring 
or concealing a terrorist who committed a federal crime of 
terrorism (such as an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2339 or 
§ 2339A); or (B) obstructing an investigation of a federal crime 
of terrorism, shall be considered to have involved, or to have 
been intended to promote, that federal crime of terrorism. 
3.  Computation of Criminal History Category.—Under 
subsection (b), if the defendant‟s criminal history category as 
determined under Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal 
Livelihood) is less than Category VI, it shall be increased to 
Category VI. 
4.  Upward Departure Provision.—By the terms of the directive 
to the Commission in section 730 of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the adjustment provided by 
this guideline applies only to federal crimes of terrorism. 
However, there may be cases in which (A) the offense was 
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct but the offense involved, or was intended to promote, an 
offense other than one of the offenses specifically enumerated in 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B); or (B) the offense involved, or was 
intended to promote, one of the offenses specifically enumerated 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), but the terrorist motive was to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, rather than to 
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. In such 
cases an upward departure would be warranted, except that the 
sentence resulting from such a departure may not exceed the top 
of the guideline range that would have resulted if the adjustment 
under this guideline had been applied. 
 
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007). 
 
  
 
